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Abstract 
New forms of communication technology often pose challenges to the copyright regime and have 
necessitated the rewriting of the scope of the exclusive rights and exceptions by the legislature, and, in 
some cases, by the courts in common law countries (as well as the Court of Justice of the European 
Union). These issues have arisen in different categories of digital technology, albeit with the same 
objective of streamlining and simplifying the delivery of copyright works to consumers. These categories 
include file storage and transfer operations offered by Peer-to-Peer technology, the space- and time-
shifting functions of the early video and audio recording products, user-generated and industry content 
deliverable via new media streaming platforms, the ‘live’ streaming and time-shifting services offered by 
remote and wireless digital recording systems, file storage and sharing digital lockers and cloud 
technology. This article will examine the legality of Internet streaming and time-shifting technologies 
under copyright law, specifically in relation to the rights of ‘reproduction’ and ‘communication to the 
public’, through a comparative analysis of the jurisprudence in leading jurisdictions in recent times. 
Although the decisions are not always consistent, they do provide some helpful guidance in our 
assessment of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the various arguments made on both sides of the 
divide as well as of the prevailing judicial sentiment towards new technologies. In light of the continuing 
legal uncertainty faced by such technologies, the authors also offer suggestions as regards legislative 
amendments and alternative business models to ensure their continued existence in this harsh and highly 
competitive digital environment. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
New modes of online access and distribution continue to challenge the boundaries of copyright law and, 
more specifically, the ambit of the copyright owner’s bundle of exclusive rights. In particular, a string of 
recently-decided cases that have gone before some of the highest courts in the Commonwealth and the 
European Union have considered the legality of various online streaming and recording technologies that 
allow for the ‘live’ streaming and ‘time-shifting’ of copyrighted content, such as television (TV) 
programmes and audio files. 
In the USA, the US Supreme Court (USSC) has also had several opportunities to determine the scope of 
the right to manage creative content by various parties—including copyright owners, providers of storage, 
access and distribution technology as well as consumers—in an increasingly complex technological 
landscape. Sony Corp of America v Universal City Studios, Inc (‘Sony Betamax’),1 decided in 1984, 
seemed complicated enough when it dealt with a physical home video recording device, which 
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subsequently formed the prototype for modern wireless and digital recording technologies that developed. 
However, with the emergence and proliferation of electronic access and distribution technologies (with 
their accompanying slate of business methodologies) as well as the more extensive geographical reach of 
such technologies, the USSC and the apex courts in other leading jurisdictions like the EU, Canada, 
Australia and Singapore have had to grapple with the problem of reconciling the original policy 
objectives of the copyright regime and the burgeoning (but often divergent) public interest in 
accommodating the development of these new technologies. 
Similarly, the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) line of cases—from the Ninth Circuit’s decision in A&M Records, Inc v 
Napster, Inc2 to the USSC’s 2005 decision in MGM Studios, Inc v Grokster, Ltd (‘Grokster’),3 together 
with the most recent USSC decision in American Broadcasting Cos, Inc v Aereo, Inc (‘Aereo’)4 in 2014—
illustrates how judges have to deal with the difficult task of balancing the competing interests of the 
various stakeholders within the copyright framework. It is noteworthy that both the Grokster and Aereo 
judgments were issued with inconsistent opinions, and in the latter case, by a Court fundamentally 
divided on the matter. Grokster and Aereo offered a ‘clawing back’ of rights to copyright owners as the 
panacea for the negative effects of new technologies that have flourished since Sony Betamax, 
technologies that were inconceivable in the 1980s when this case was decided. Furthermore, courts 
continue to grapple with this balancing of interests within the strictures of existing provisions in copyright 
legislation that generally were not drafted to deal with these sophisticated technologies. 
From the global perspective, Aereo is the latest addition to the line of cases emanating from the top courts 
of Commonwealth jurisdictions, all of which have largely favoured protecting the rights of copyright 
owners (save for the anomalous decision of the Singapore Court of Appeal in RecordTV Pte Ltd v 
MediaCorp TV Singapore Pte Ltd).5 The Section ‘Internet streaming and time-shifting in the Courts’ of 
this article sets the stage for a detailed analysis of these decisions by categorizing them under the relevant 
exclusive right(s) which had been breached and according to their relevant laws. The authors will also 
study the functions and operation of the technology in question and critically examine the rationale 
behind the courts’ decisions. 
In the Section ‘Possible legal exceptions or exemptions and alternative business models’ of this article, 
the authors offer an overview of the different technology providers and companies presently in existence 
as well as some alternative business models or strategies that technology companies offering online 
recording and streaming services could possibly adopt to avoid infringement liability. The authors will 
also briefly canvass the possibility of once again utilizing the open-ended fair use doctrine in the US (or 
its equivalent in other jurisdictions, where available) and the possibility of targeted legislative 
amendments (in the form of introducing specific exceptions or safe harbours) to exempt the use of such 
technologies, based on their function, from copyright liability. 
INTERNET STREAMING AND TIME-SHIFTING IN THE COURTS 
In the modern world, Internet functionality necessarily requires adjustments in copyright law in order to 
accommodate electronic communication and storage of information. With regard to the online time-
shifting and streaming functions that we are concerned with here, the exclusive rights of ‘reproduction’ as 
well as ‘communication to the public’ (or the right of ‘public performance’ in the USA) have been 
rigorously asserted by copyright owners and fiercely challenged by technology providers before the 
courts in many jurisdictions. 
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Copyright owner’s exclusive right of reproduction (right to stop copying) 
The right to reproduce a work in a material form is, of course, one of the most fundamental exclusive 
rights belonging to the copyright owner. 
Singapore 
In Singapore, the copyright statute defines reproduction as including the making of a sound recording or 
cinematograph film of a literary, dramatic or musical work.6 Turning to neighbouring rights, copyright in 
relation to a TV broadcast—insofar as it consists of visual images—is the exclusive right to make a 
cinematograph film of the broadcast,7 whereas copyright in relation to a cinematograph film is the 
exclusive right, inter alia, to make a copy of the film.8 Quite clearly, some or all of these exclusive rights 
of the copyright owner will be implicated whenever a third party, without permission, decides to offer an 
online recording facility. To understand why this is so, we will start by briefly examining the facts in 
RecordTV Pte Ltd v MediaCorp TV Singapore Pte Ltd (‘RecordTV’),9 a landmark decision of the 
Singapore Court of Appeal in December 2010. 
The RecordTV decision was concerned with the legality of an online recording service. The plaintiff, 
RecordTV, ran an Internet business which provided complimentary recording services (essentially a time-
shifting facility) to members of the public who had pre-registered with them on their website. Subscribers 
to this online service were able to request for free-to-air programmes from a number of TV channels (pre-
determined by RecordTV) to be recorded for their later viewing. The defendant, MediaCorp, was the 
owner of copyright in the various broadcasts and films (collectively, the ‘relevant MediaCorp shows’) 
which had been recorded. 
This was how the RecordTV system worked. Once a request was received from a registered subscriber, 
RecordTV’s Internet-based digital video recorder (iDVR)—at its remote location—would identify the 
relevant programme and make a copy of it at the time of its broadcast. The recorded programme would 
then be stored on RecordTV’s online servers for a period of 15 days, during which time the subscriber 
could log on to the website and gain access to and view the requested recording. After 15 days, the 
recorded programme would be deleted. It is pertinent to note that RecordTV’s iDVR system (which was 
completely automated) actually underwent three different phases of operation, a point to which we will 
return later when we discuss the right of ‘communication to the public’. 
MediaCorp subsequently sent RecordTV cease-and-desist letters for copyright infringement, whereupon 
the latter initiated proceedings against the former—pursuant to section 200(1) of the Singapore Copyright 
Act 1987—for groundless threats of copyright infringement. In defence, MediaCorp pleaded that 
RecordTV had infringed their copyright in the relevant MediaCorp shows. Although MediaCorp initially 
prevailed before the trial judge, RecordTV’s appeal eventually succeeded before the Court of Appeal 
(CA). 
One of the main issues which arose for consideration was whether RecordTV had copied the relevant 
MediaCorp shows (ie whether RecordTV was the ‘maker’ of the online recordings in question). On this 
point, both the trial judge and the CA were in agreement. Relying on the authority of Cartoon Network 
LP, LLLP v CSC Holdings Inc (‘Cartoon Network’),10 a decision of the US Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, the CA held that it was the registered subscriber—and not RecordTV—who had copied 
the relevant MediaCorp shows (through his request for the recording of these shows via the iDVR 
system). 
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This conclusion was arrived at after the CA (as well as the earlier Second Circuit) took the following 
matters into consideration:  
1. a purported analogy between the subscribers of the online recording facility (namely, 
Cablevision’s remote-storage digital video recording (RS-DVR) system in Cartoon Network and 
the iDVR system in RecordTV) and users of the ‘ancient’ VCR (or self-service photocopier);11 
and 
2. that, in both cases, the main volitional agent who engaged in copying (and who supplied the bulk 
of the relevant ‘volitional conduct’) was the user/subscriber himself, and not the provider/supplier 
of the recording facility. 
The present authors have articulated their views elsewhere and put forward the contrary argument that the 
provider of the online recording facility—both in Cartoon Network and RecordTV—ought to have been 
held liable for making unauthorized copies of copyright-protected TV broadcasts and films.12 Indeed, the 
very narrow interpretation of the word ‘make’ adopted by the courts in both decisions, if correct, would 
seriously throw into doubt the efficacy of the copyright owner’s exclusive right of ‘reproduction’ in the 
digital environment. 
To briefly reiterate our views, we had earlier submitted that:  
1. the CA in RecordTV should not have relied on the Cartoon Network precedent because the 
analogy drawn above is inappropriate in many respects. The RS-DVR and iDVR systems are not 
simply ‘digital versions’ of the traditional VCR/photocopier, particularly as regards the extent of 
volition or the element of control over recordable content;13 
2. there is no evidence of any ‘continuing relationship’ between the vendor/manufacturer of the 
VCR/photocopier and the consumer/user, quite unlike the ongoing relationships between 
Cablevision/RecordTV and their respective subscribers; and 
3. Cablevision/RecordTV do not qualify as mere ‘passive conduits’ for the (so-called ‘automatic’) 
delivery of online content to their respective subscribers. Quite the contrary, they were active 
participants in the entire process of recording, hosting and delivery. Their conduct, as a whole, 
clearly assumes a nexus that is sufficiently proximate and causal to the prohibited acts in 
question. 
Since the main volitional agent in the entire enterprise is the provider of the online recording facility, 
Cablevision and RecordTV—and not their respective subscribers—ought to assume primary copyright 
liability for having recorded/copied the TV programmes in question. 
Before turning to some recent developments in the case law, we wish to raise, for the reader’s 
contemplation, the following hypothetical. 
Let us assume that Andy chances upon a self-service vending machine which offers an array of simple, 
made-to-order dishes. He places a specific order for pasta by putting money into the machine and pressing 
the order button. Let us also assume that the cooking process is entirely automated—there is no human 
chef involved at all. The meal is then prepared and served to Andy, all by way of automation. Who, in this 
scenario, has made/cooked the pasta? Would it be Andy, the customer? 
Undoubtedly, Andy is the last ‘human actor’ or the person who committed the ‘last volitional act’ in the 
process just described. If the reasoning in Cartoon Network and RecordTV were correct, then Andy—as 
the main volitional agent and the party who supplied the ‘last volitional act’—must be deemed the 
‘maker’ of the dish in question. Is this, however, a sensible conclusion to reach on these facts? 
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Arguably, the whole idea of ordering food from an automated vending machine is to save the customer 
time and effort (because the customer does not wish to cook his own food and wants to rely completely 
on someone else to do the work for him). Just because Andy’s pressing of the order button at the vending 
machine—the ‘last volitional act’—actually triggers (in a ‘but-for’ sense) a whole sequence of actions 
which ultimately result in a cooked meal of pasta does not, ipso facto, mean that Andy was the ‘maker’ of 
that dish. To argue in line with the reasoning in Cartoon Network and RecordTV that it is the customer 
who has actually done the cooking in this instance flies in the face of logic. 
In our attempt to identify who, exactly, has made/cooked the pasta, it is important also to reflect on the 
question as to whether mere automation of the cooking process should have any impact on the answer. 
The fear, of course, is that endorsing the ‘volitional conduct’ theory (as articulated in Cartoon Network 
and accepted by the CA in RecordTV) may well result in a proliferation of business models which are 
specifically designed to elude the reach of the copyright owner’s bundle of exclusive rights, particularly 
so in the online environment where automation, de-centralization and consumer autonomy have now 
become the norm. 
However, that fear may now be unfounded—at least in Australia—with the decision of the Full Court of 
the Federal Court of Australia (the ‘Full Court’) in National Rugby League Investments Pty Ltd v Singtel 
Optus Pty Ltd (‘Optus’).14 
Australia 
The Full Court in Optus had the opportunity to consider the scope of the copyright owner’s exclusive 
right of ‘reproduction’ in relation to facts almost identical to those in RecordTV. The defendant (Optus) 
was a leading provider of communications services in Australia. Its TV Now time-shifting subscription 
service enabled a subscriber to have free-to-air TV programmes on football and rugby matches (the 
copyright in which belonged to the plaintiff) recorded as and when they were broadcast, and then played 
back at the time(s) of the subscriber’s choosing. As is apparent, the TV Now system (which, like 
RecordTV’s iDVR system, was fully automated) entailed the copying and storing of TV broadcasts 
requested by and recorded for the individual subscriber concerned, hence the allegations by the plaintiff 
of copyright infringement. 
For present purposes, the primary issue which the Full Court had to decide was who, whenever a TV 
broadcast was recorded for an individual subscriber, was the ‘maker’ of that copy pursuant to sections 
86(a),15 87(a) and 87(b)16 of the Australian Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)? Was it the defendant (Optus), the 
subscriber, or both of them jointly? The trial judge had decided that it was the subscriber—and not 
Optus—who was the maker of the recording in question, a conclusion compatible with the outcomes 
reached by the courts in Cartoon Network and RecordTV, which held that the subscriber alone was 
responsible for the creation of the copies, that no copies were made unless a subscriber required this to be 
done and that the fully-automated online service offered by each defendant was substantively no different 
from a VCR/DVR or a self-service photocopier. 
On appeal, the Full Court held that the maker of the recordings in question was Optus or, in the 
alternative, Optus and the subscriber jointly.17 The appellate court also considered—but roundly 
rejected—two other possible outcomes: that the relevant copies were made by Optus as ‘agent’ for the 
subscriber, or that they were made by the subscriber as ‘principal’ himself. 
The agency argument was instantly dismissed because there was no evidence whatsoever (contractual or 
otherwise) of any principal-agent relationship between Optus and its subscribers.18 
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In disagreeing with the trial judge that the subscriber ought to be treated as the ‘principal’ in the making 
of the relevant TV recordings, the Full Court was of the view that this particular conception of the word 
‘make’ ‘… robs the entirely automated copying process [of the TV Now service] of any significance 
beyond that of being the vehicle which does the making of copies’.19 Instead, the word should convey the 
idea of ‘making (ie creating or producing) a physical thing (ie the embodiment of the copyright subject 
matter)’, which is in line with its dictionary definition.20 
The appellate court also rejected the ‘last volitional act’ argument, which asserts that because the 
subscriber, by performing the last volitional act in clicking the ‘record’ button, triggers a sequence of 
actions which ultimately lead to copies being made, the identity of the maker is the subscriber himself.21 
The Court further disagreed with the trial judge’s observation that the TV Now system was substantially 
analogous to such copying devices as the photocopier and the VCR/DVR.22 Indeed, the Court opined that 
‘analogies [were] not necessarily helpful’ and that the TV Now system had actually been ‘designed in a 
way that [made] Optus the “main performer of the act of [copying]”’.23 
To reinforce its view that Optus was indeed the ‘maker’ of the relevant copies of TV broadcasts and was 
not simply making available its technology to other third parties who use it to make copies for 
themselves, the Full Court reasoned that Optus’ role in the entire process of making copies was so 
‘pervasive’ that, even though the TV Now system was completely automated, it could not be disregarded 
for the purposes of identifying who the maker was.24 Further, the Court said that ‘[e]ven if one were to 
require volitional conduct proximate to the copying, Optus’ creating and keeping in constant readiness the 
TV Now system would satisfy that requirement’.25 
This conclusion aside (that Optus alone was the ‘maker’), the Court was also prepared to accept the 
possibility that both Optus and the subscriber could be held jointly and severally liable for the act of 
copying (ie as joint makers/copyists):26 
If one focused not only upon the automated service which is held out as able to produce, and which 
actually produces, the copies but also on the causative agency that is responsible for the copies being 
made at all, the need for a more complex characterisation is suggested. The subscriber, by selecting the 
programme to be copied and by confirming that it is to be copied, can properly be said to be the person 
who instigates the copying. Yet it is Optus which effects it. Without the concerted actions of both there 
would be no copy made of a football match for the subscriber. Without the subscriber’s involvement, 
nothing would be created; without Optus’ involvement nothing would be copied. They have needed to act 
in concert to produce – they each have contributed to – a commonly desired outcome. … 
Indeed, the Court’s ‘preferred view’ (without definitively deciding the point) was that both Optus and the 
subscriber—having acted together in concert pursuant to a common design—be found liable as joint 
makers of the relevant copies.27 The end result, therefore, was that Optus, on either interpretation, was 
found to have infringed the copyright interests of the plaintiff (since its pleaded defence pursuant to 
section 11128 of the Australian copyright statute had also failed before the Court). 
Notably, Optus’ application for special leave to appeal this decision was rejected by the High Court of 
Australia on 7 September 2012. Counsel for Optus tried, in argument, to persuade the High Court that the 
Full Court had wrongly relied on the Japanese precedent29 and ought to have placed greater weight on the 
Cartoon Network and RecordTV decisions. Justice Gummow, who did not even need to hear submissions 
from opposing counsel, simply dismissed Optus’ application thus: 
There are insufficient prospects of success in displacing the result reached by the Full Court of the 
Federal Court to warrant a grant of special leave. Nor are we satisfied that consideration of the particular 
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facts of this case could yield any universal proposition respecting the application of section 111 of the 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). Accordingly, special leave in each application is refused with costs. 
For now, it appears that the final word on the subject in Australia rests with the decision of the Full Court. 
Although the Court did not reach a conclusive view as to who, precisely, was the ‘maker’ of the relevant 
TV recordings, it did accept that the provider of the online recording facility was a potentially suitable 
candidate. More importantly, though, the Court’s pronouncement that the individual subscriber clearly did 
not qualify as ‘maker’ (in his capacity as the ‘principal’) stands in stark contrast to the outcomes reached 
by the courts in Cartoon Network and RecordTV. Given our views expressed elsewhere,30 the authors 
support the Australian position, although it remains to be seen whether it will ultimately gain traction in 
other jurisdictions. 
Copyright owner’s exclusive right of ‘Communication to the Public’ 
Internet businesses which provide online recording as well as ‘live’ streaming services ought to be 
mindful also of the copyright owner’s exclusive right of ‘communication to the public’. The right of 
‘communication to the public’ (including the more specific right of ‘making available to the public’) is 
provided for in the copyright statutes of jurisdictions which have implemented Article 8 of the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) Copyright Treaty 1996 (or Articles 10 and 14 of the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty 1996).31 In the USA, the equivalent right, arguably, is the right of 
‘public performance’.32 
The word ‘communicate’, in Singapore’s copyright statute,33 means: 
to transmit by electronic means (whether over a path, or a combination of paths, provided by a material 
substance or by wireless means or otherwise) a work or other subject-matter, whether or not it is sent in 
response to a request, and includes –  
 the broadcasting of a work or other subject-matter; 
 the inclusion of a work or other subject-matter in a cable programme; and 
 the making available of a work or other subject-matter (on a network or otherwise) in 
such a way that the work or subject-matter may be accessed by any person from a place 
and at a time chosen by him … . 
From this definition, the following distinct forms of communication are discernible:  
1. A (general) transmission of a copyright work by electronic means—whether over a path, or a 
combination of paths, provided by a material substance or by wireless means or otherwise, and 
whether or not the said transmission is sent in response to a request; 
2. A transmission of a copyright work by broadcasting the work; 
3. A transmission of a copyright work by including the work in a cable programme; and 
4. Making available a copyright work in such a way that the work may be accessed by any person 
from a place and at a time chosen by him. 
In short, the copyright owner’s umbrella right of ‘communication’ encompasses, apart from a general 
right to transmit a work by electronic means, the more specific rights of ‘broadcasting’, ‘cable-casting’ 
and ‘making available’. The introduction of this exclusive right of ‘communication’ in the statute was 
intended to control the active transmission and dissemination of copyright works on the Internet (as is the 
case where ‘push’ technologies are concerned)34 as well as to regulate indiscriminate access to such 
works in the online environment (as is the case where ‘pull’ technologies are concerned).35 
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Providers of online recording (time-shifting) services—such as Cablevision and RecordTV—must 
therefore be cognisant that their business models may violate the copyright owner’s exclusive right of 
‘communication to the public’ and hence attract copyright liability. This is because online recording 
services are typical examples of ‘pull’ technologies, involving a passive communicator (eg RecordTV) 
and multiple active recipients (namely, its registered subscribers). The individual subscriber concerned, in 
order to obtain access to the relevant TV programme(s) recorded by RecordTV, will have to initiate the 
transmission process by first logging-in to RecordTV’s website, entering the relevant password, 
accessing his personal playlist and then viewing the recorded show(s) on his personal computer at the 
time(s) of his choosing. 
Likewise, providers of online ‘live’ streaming services may also be implicated under the same head of 
liability, but for a different reason. Whereas recording/time-shifting involves a passive communicator 
with multiple active recipients, ‘live’ streaming (which essentially entails re-broadcasting over the 
Internet) arguably involves an active communicator who transmits or disseminates copyright material to 
multiple passive recipients. Streaming technology is therefore one example of ‘push’ technology where 
service providers—like TV Catchup and Aereo (to be discussed below)—that stream ‘live’ free-to-air TV 
shows will have to re-transmit the original broadcast signals to their registered subscribers (who arguably 
constitute members of the public). 
Singapore 
Once again, we begin our analysis with the RecordTV decision, which presented the first opportunity for 
the apex court in Singapore to examine the scope of the copyright owner’s exclusive right to 
‘communicate’ a work (or other subject-matter) to ‘the public’. The issue, essentially, was whether 
RecordTV—having recorded, stored and made available to its subscribers copies of MediaCorp shows on 
its online servers—did ‘communicate’ the relevant MediaCorp shows to ‘the public’ (within the meaning 
of sections 83(c) and 84(1)(d) of the Singapore Copyright Act 1987).36 
The CA (in disagreeing with the trial judge) decided that it did not because (1) RecordTV was not the 
party responsible for making the communication (ie RecordTV was not the ‘communicator’), and (2) 
there was no communication made to ‘the public’. We have similarly stated our views elsewhere37 as 
regards this particular aspect of the CA’s judgment and will therefore only briefly reiterate our arguments 
relating to the latter. 
On the facts, the CA came to the conclusion that there was no communication made to ‘the public’ 
principally because during the third phase of RecordTV’s operations,38 each recorded MediaCorp show 
could only be accessed by a single subscriber who had earlier made a specific request for that particular 
show. As VK Rajah JA put it, 
[s]ince Registered Users could only view those MediaCorp shows which they had requested to be 
recorded, those shows were communicated to the relevant Registered Users privately and individually. 
The aggregate of private communications to each Registered User is not, in this instance, a 
communication to the public.39 
However, as we have respectfully suggested elsewhere, adopting such a technical interpretation would, 
effectively, place ‘form’ over ‘substance’. Whilst it is true that each copy of a MediaCorp show made by 
RecordTV could only be retrieved by an individual subscriber (evidence which merely goes to form), we 
have argued that the iDVR system, in substance, still ‘makes available’ that TV show to any member of 
the public—so long as he is a registered subscriber and has specifically requested the same show—who 
can access it from any place and at any time of his choosing. In other words, although each respective 
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communication (between RecordTV and subscriber) appears to be private and individual in form, the 
reality, in substance, is that the aggregate of all these ‘private’ communications transforms the nature of 
such communications into ‘public’ communications. 
To further buttress our argument, we have sought to explain that the right of ‘communication to the 
public’ should rightly be analysed from the perspective of the potential audience of the ‘underlying 
copyright work’ (namely, the MediaCorp show in question), rather than from the perspective of the 
potential audience of a ‘particular communication/transmission’. Indeed, the key to answering this 
question as to whether RecordTV’s communications were made to ‘the public’ would be (1) to consider 
the relationship of the ‘recipient’ of the copyright work (ie the registered subscribers of the iDVR service 
collectively) vis-à-vis the ‘copyright owner’ (ie MediaCorp), and not that of the ‘recipient’ vis-à-vis the 
‘communicator’ (ie RecordTV), and then (2) to ask whether the potential audience/recipient of the 
copyright work is part of the ‘copyright owner’s public’.40 
Under this approach, it is submitted that because the registered subscribers of RecordTV—who requested 
the same MediaCorp show and who (from the evidence) formed a not insignificant segment of the 
public—were not in any way bound by domestic or family ties (ie a sizeable group of unrelated persons), 
they must, collectively, have constituted MediaCorp’s ‘public’.41 As such, we respectfully disagree with 
the CA’s conclusion on this issue and submit that RecordTV had indeed ‘communicated’ (or ‘made 
available’) the relevant MediaCorp shows to ‘the public’ through its iDVR service. 
If, at this stage, the reader is still unconvinced by our arguments above, perhaps we should pause and 
consider why RecordTV’s iDVR system had undergone three different phases of operation since its 
inception. In its first phase, the system operated in the ‘Single Instance Storage (SIS)’ mode where only 
one recording was made by RecordTV despite multiple end-user requests for the same MediaCorp show 
(ie one copy/file for multiple subscribers). This process clearly eliminated the duplication of copies by 
allowing multiple subscribers to share one copy of a recording. Later, during its third phase of operations 
in ‘Multiple Copy’ mode, multiple copies of the same MediaCorp show would be recorded by RecordTV 
based on the number of subscribers requesting that particular show (ie one copy/file per subscriber). 
Why then did RecordTV regress from the initial ‘SIS’ mode of operation to the (technologically 
inefficient) ‘Multiple Copy’ mode? Why the unnecessary duplication of copies which seemed to have 
served ‘no apparent engineering [or technical] objective’?42 In our view, the ‘one copy per subscriber’ 
model was deliberately adopted by RecordTV for the sole purpose of avoiding primary copyright liability, 
so that it could align its modus operandi with what, it thought, was legally permissible under copyright 
law. 
We turn now to consider how other leading jurisdictions—namely, the UK, EU, Canada and the USA—
have approached this issue. 
UK 
In the UK, the right of ‘communication to the public’ (including the right of ‘making available to the 
public’) is enshrined in section 20(2) of the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA),43 the 
scope of which was considered by Kitchin J in ITV Broadcasting Ltd v TV Catch Up Ltd.44 The defendant 
(TV Catchup) provided an online ‘live’ streaming facility for the plaintiffs’ free-to-air TV broadcasts in 
the UK.45 The TV programmes streamed via the defendant’s service—unlike a traditional broadcast 
where the relevant TV programme is beamed or transmitted for simultaneous reception by members of 
the public (ie ‘one to many’)—could only be accessed/viewed by its registered subscribers ‘privately and 
individually’ (ie ‘one to one’). When the plaintiffs (all broadcasters) instituted copyright infringement 
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proceedings against TV Catchup, it applied to the English High Court for summary judgment on the basis 
that the plaintiffs’ claim had no real prospect of success. 
In dismissing the application for summary judgment, Kitchin J took the view that the right of 
‘communication to the public’ ought to be ‘interpreted broadly so as to cover all communication to the 
public not present where the communication originates’.46 
Counsel for the defendant had sought to argue that: 
[O]ne cannot communicate a broadcast other than by means of a mode of delivery which has the 
characteristics of a broadcast. These characteristics include transmission for simultaneous reception by 
members of the public, that is to say ‘one to many’. By contrast, … the defendant’s transmission is not 
‘one to many’ but rather ‘one to one’. So, whatever may be the scope of section 20 in relation to other 
categories of work, in the case of a broadcast it is limited to the single restricted act of broadcasting.47 
To this submission, Kitchin J reasoned thus:48 
I am unable to accept this argument which, in my judgment, confuses the protected work and the 
restricted act. They are different. The protected work, the broadcast, is the transmission of visual images, 
sounds and other information for reception by or presentation to members of the public. The restricted act 
is the communication to the public by electronic transmission of all of those images, sounds and other 
information. 
Kitchin J emphasized that the definition in section 20(2) would encompass all acts (apart from the two 
specific examples provided therein, namely ‘broadcasting’ and ‘making available’) which constitute a 
‘communication to the public’ of the work by electronic transmission. The fact that the defendant’s 
transmissions were not ‘broadcasts’ as traditionally understood (ie ‘one to many’) was not at all fatal to 
the plaintiffs’ claim, which Kitchin J considered had a real prospect of success. 
The dispute between the commercial broadcasters and TV Catchup was eventually heard before Floyd J 
in the English High Court in ITV Broadcasting Ltd v TV Catchup Ltd.49 Basically, the TV Catchup system 
operated as follows:  
 users created an account with log-in details—they could only obtain access to content which they 
were already legally entitled to watch in the UK by virtue of their TV licence; 
 the service was funded by advertising; 
 the service captured the normal terrestrial and satellite broadcast signals transmitted by the 
plaintiffs via a single domestic TV aerial and a single satellite dish; 
 these signals were then converted by software in the defendant’s servers into a format that 
allowed video streams (containing a TV channel each) to be sent over the Internet; 
 a TV channel was only streamed to a subscriber of the defendant’s service when a request was 
received for that channel from the user in question—if there was no such request, there was no 
streaming involved. Also, a separate stream was created for each requesting user, ie an individual 
packet of data leaving the defendant’s server was always addressed to an individual user (and not 
to a class of users); and 
 at no stage during the process described above was the whole or any part of the video stream 
stored on any disk or other permanent storage medium—all processing took place in volatile 
memory. 
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One of the questions before the judge was whether the defendant’s provision of an online ‘live’ streaming 
service amounted to an infringement of the plaintiffs’ exclusive right of ‘communication to the public’ of 
their broadcasts and films pursuant to section 20(1)(c) of the UK CDPA 1988. The plaintiffs argued that 
whenever there was an intervention by a broadcasting organization other than the original one, there 
would be a ‘communication to the public’ because the re-transmitted signals targeted members of the 
public who were not the direct recipients of the original signals. In other words, the recipients of the re-
transmitted signals got to enjoy the broadcast works only on account of the defendant’s intervention as a 
re-broadcaster. In response, the defendant pleaded that they did not own or control the equipment on 
which the user chose to view the broadcast (ie the lack of control/volition argument) and that they were 
merely providing technical means which made it easier for users to receive what they could, in principle, 
receive by other means. 
Although Floyd J ultimately referred several questions of law to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU), his Lordship did arrive at a provisional view—that the defendant had indeed 
communicated the plaintiffs’ broadcasts and films to the public. An important distinction had to be drawn 
between acts of third parties which were merely supportive of the copyright owner’s exploitation of the 
underlying copyright works (eg providing technical means to ensure or improve reception in the 
catchment area of the TV broadcast) and those which were clearly independent exploitations of such 
works (especially for profit) and in competition with the copyright owner. In his Lordship’s view, the 
latter conduct—as exemplified by the TV Catchup service—would fall foul of the copyright owner’s 
exclusive right of ‘communication to the public’. 
Turning to the defendant’s ‘live’ streaming of TV broadcasts to its subscribers on an individual, ad hoc 
basis, Floyd J was convinced that the aggregate of all these individual communications made by the 
defendant ought rightly to be regarded as communications to ‘the public’, rather than as a plurality of 
‘individual’ and ‘private’ communications.50 His Lordship opined that it was ‘appropriate to look 
cumulatively at the communications in the present case, rather than regarding them as an aggregate of 
individual ones’.51 Further, in response to the defendant’s reliance on the authority of the RecordTV 
decision of the Singapore CA (which held that the aggregate of private communications to each 
individual subscriber was not a communication to ‘the public’), Floyd J was of the view thus:52 
To the extent that this conclusion [of mine] is inconsistent with one of the grounds for decision in 
RecordTV, I respectfully differ from it. Although the Singapore Court was applying a provision of 
Singapore law derived from the same international convention [i.e. Article 8 of the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty 1996], I find it difficult to reconcile the conclusion reached there with the reasoning in Rafael 
Hoteles … and the obvious desire in the Directive to provide for a technologically neutral definition of 
communication to the public. It would be an unfortunate result if a point-to-multipoint communication 
were to be actionable but a number of point to point transmissions were not. 
Be that as it may, his Lordship decided to seek guidance from the CJEU as to whether the online ‘live’ 
streaming service provided by the defendant in this case (‘an organisation other than the original 
broadcaster’) was in breach of the plaintiffs’ right of ‘communication to the public’, notwithstanding that 
the defendant’s ‘server allows only a “one-to-one” connection for each subscriber whereby each 
individual subscriber establishes his or her own Internet connection to the server and every data packet 
sent by the server onto the Internet is addressed to only one individual subscriber’.53 We shall discuss the 
CJEU’s decision in the next section. 
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EU 
The locus classicus in this regard under European law is the decision of the CJEU in Sociedad General de 
Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SL,54 where the Court famously enunciated that 
the right of ‘communication to the public’ in Article 3(1) of the EU Information Society Directive 
(2001/29) must be ‘interpreted broadly’ so as ‘to establish a high level of protection of … authors’.55 In 
Rafael Hoteles, the installation of TV sets in individual hotel rooms amounted to a ‘communication’ by 
the defendant (hotel proprietor) of copyright broadcast signals to ‘the public’, because such TV 
transmissions were ‘made by a broadcasting organisation other than the original one’ to ‘a public different 
from the public at which the original act of communication of the work [was] directed, that is, to a new 
public’.56 In other words, it was decided that the transmission of TV signals to the occupants of individual 
hotel rooms was, in law, a communication to a ‘new public’, since the hotel had intervened—in full 
knowledge of the consequences of its action—to give access to the protected works to its customers (who 
were unrelated members of the public and not within the contemplation of the copyright owner at the time 
of the original broadcast).57 The CJEU did, however, acknowledge that the mere provision of physical 
facilities (eg ‘companies specialising in the sale or hire of television sets’) does not ordinarily constitute a 
‘communication to the public’ but it was clear that this exception did not apply on the facts of this case.58 
Crucially, the hotel’s distribution of broadcast signals by means of TV sets to its customers—albeit 
staying and receiving these signals in individual/separate hotel rooms—had the overall effect of granting 
them access to the copyright works in question,59 thereby infringing the right of ‘communication to the 
public’. 
We return to the TV Catchup case. In considering the various questions referred by Floyd J, the CJEU in 
ITV Broadcasting Ltd v TVCatchup Ltd60 again reiterated that the ‘principal objective’ of the EU 
Information Society Directive (2001/29) was to ‘establish a high level of protection of authors’ and that 
the copyright owner’s exclusive right of ‘communication to the public’ must be ‘interpreted broadly’.61 
As to whether there had been any ‘communication’ (within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 
2001/29) made by the defendant in the present case, the CJEU answered in the affirmative as the 
retransmission of the plaintiffs’ terrestrial TV broadcasts over the Internet via the defendant’s ‘live’ 
steaming service involved ‘a specific technical means different from that of the original 
communication’.62 The defendant, therefore, had to acquire fresh or separate authorisation for such 
retransmission from the copyright owners, notwithstanding that the defendant was merely providing its 
subscribers with an alternative mode of access to TV shows which they could, in any event, lawfully 
watch on their own TV sets at home. 
Although the Court did acknowledge—based on its prior jurisprudence—that a mere technical means to 
ensure or improve reception of the original transmission in its catchment area does not constitute a 
‘communication’,63 this ‘mere technical means’ exception did not apply to the facts of this case because 
the defendant’s intervention involved ‘a transmission of the protected works at issue which [was] different 
from that of the broadcasting organisation concerned’ and was ‘in no way intended to maintain or 
improve the quality of the transmission by that other broadcasting organisation’.64 
Turning then to the next question as to whether the defendant’s ‘communication’ in the instant case was 
to ‘the public’, the CJEU made the following important observations:  
 The term ‘public’ refers to an ‘indeterminate number of potential recipients’ and implies a ‘fairly 
large number of persons’;65 
 The cumulative effect of making the works available to potential recipients should be taken into 
account—in particular, it is relevant to ascertain the number of persons who have access to the 
same work at the same time and successively;66 and 
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 It is irrelevant whether the potential recipients access the copyright works through a ‘one-to-one 
connection’ as this technique (or technical form) ‘does not prevent a large number of persons 
having access to the same work at the same time’.67 
In the context of the ‘live’ streaming of TV programmes on the Internet, the defendant’s retransmission of 
the plaintiffs’ copyright works was clearly aimed at an indeterminate (and a fairly large) number of 
subscribers—collectively unrelated—who could all access the same TV programmes at the same time.68 
As such, the Court held that the plaintiffs’ copyright works had indeed been communicated by the 
defendant to ‘the public’. 
It is submitted that the interpretation adopted by the CJEU in relation to the right of ‘communication to 
the public’ is unassailable. Indeed, the Court was astute not to allow form (or technicalities) to trump the 
true substance of the communication (or retransmission in this case). Crucially, the Court emphasized that 
it is the cumulative effect of making the (same) work available to potential recipients that ultimately 
matters, and not how (or in what form) each individual recipient had obtained access to the copyright 
work in question. In this regard, the authors suggest that the RecordTV decision should be re-considered 
in light of the CJEU’s decision and reasoning in this case. 
Canada 
It comes as no surprise to the authors that the Canadian perspective on this issue is not at all dissimilar. 
Indeed, in the seminal, decade-old decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in CCH Canadian Ltd v Law 
Society of Upper Canada,69 McLachlin CJ remarked, in obiter dicta, that: 
[although] [t]he fax transmission of a single copy to a single individual is not a communication to the 
public … , a series of repeated fax transmissions of the same work to numerous different recipients might 
constitute communication to the public in infringement of copyright.70 
More recently, the apex court in Canada again had the opportunity to consider the ambit of the copyright 
owner’s exclusive right of ‘communication to the public’ in Rogers Communications Inc v Society of 
Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada.71 The defendant (Rogers Communications) offered 
an online music service which provided users with catalogues of digital audio files. A user could select a 
song or an album and then stream the digital audio file containing the musical work to his computer 
and/or mobile phone (ie on-demand streaming of copyright works). The plaintiff, the Society of 
Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada (SOCAN), is a collective society which files 
proposed tariffs with the Canadian Copyright Board and collects royalties on behalf of its members. One 
question which the Canadian Supreme Court had to answer, which is relevant to our analysis, was 
whether the defendant’s online streaming of audio files—which had been initiated at the request of 
individual users, thereby constituting individual or point-to-point transmissions—amounted to a 
communication to ‘the public’ of the musical works contained therein in breach of section 3(1)(f) of the 
Canadian Copyright Act 1985 (c C-42).72 In other words, is a point-to-point transmission effected at the 
request of multiple individual users/recipients a ‘private’ communication or a communication to ‘the 
public’? 
The nine-member Supreme Court unanimously found in favour of the plaintiff on the issue of 
‘communication to the public by telecommunication’. In delivering the judgment of the Court, Rothstein J 
reasoned that the dispute/debate over the interpretation of the phrase ‘to the public’ is largely ‘based on 
perspective’—that is to say, whilst the defendant argues that it is the recipient of each transmission who 
matters in the final analysis, the plaintiff’s argument instead focuses on the sender’s activities in 
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communicating the copyright work(s) in question.73 It was felt, however, that the defendant’s 
perspective/proposition was ‘untenable’ for the following reasons: 
Such a rule would produce arbitrary results. For example, where a copyright-protected work is sent to 100 
randomly selected members of the general public by way of a single e-mail with multiple recipients, on 
the [defendant’s] approach, this would constitute a communication ‘to the public’. However, under the 
same approach, the sender could avoid infringing copyright simply by executing the same task through 
sending separate e-mails to each of the 100 recipients. If the nature of the activity in both cases is the 
same, albeit accomplished through different technical means, there is no justification for distinguishing 
between the two for copyright purposes.74 
Indeed, his Honour took pains to point out—just like the CJEU in the TV Catchup case—that form (or 
technicalities) should never be allowed to trump the true substance of the communication in question: 
Focusing on each individual transmission loses sight of the true character of the communication activity 
in question and makes copyright protection dependent on technicalities of the alleged infringer’s chosen 
method of operation. Such an approach does not allow for principled copyright protection. Instead, it is 
necessary to consider the broader context to determine whether a given point-to-point transmission 
engages the exclusive right to communicate to the public. This is the only way to ensure that form does 
not prevail over substance.75 
Rothstein J further clarified that the language of section 3(1)(f) of the Canadian Copyright Act 1985 did 
not limit a ‘communication’ to a purely non-interactive context and would certainly encompass 
interactive or on-demand point-to-point communications which have been initiated at the request of 
individual users/recipients. More importantly, his Honour emphasized that such a ‘broad’ interpretation of 
section 3(1)(f) was ‘not out of step with Article 8 of the [WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996] and international 
thinking on the issue’.76 
Since the defendant’s online music service entailed the indiscriminate streaming of musical works to any 
requesting member of the public with Internet access (and not just to ‘members of a narrow group, such 
as a family or a circle of friends’),77 it was apparent that the defendant had, without permission, 
communicated the relevant copyright works to ‘the public’ by telecommunication. His Honour once again 
reiterated that: 
[Where] a series of point-to-point communications of the same work to an aggregation of individuals is 
found to exist, it matters little for the purposes of copyright protection whether the members of the public 
receive the communication in the same or in different places, at the same or at different times or at their 
own or the sender’s initiative.78 
Interestingly, the defendant had also sought to rely on the authority of Cartoon Network,79 a decision of 
the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (discussed earlier). The court in Cartoon Network had 
taken the view that the potential audience of each point-to-point transmission must be considered in 
isolation to determine whether a given transmission was to ‘the public’. Rothstein J was, however, quick 
to dismiss this US authority on the basis that the statutory wording in the USA (specifically, the ‘Transmit 
Clause’ in American copyright legislation) was vastly different from that in Canada. 
Copyright Owner’s Exclusive Right of ‘Public Performance’ by ‘Transmission’ 
It was inevitable that the series of litigation in other parts of the world relating to online recording and 
distribution/re-transmission devices and services would eventually reach the USSC in the form of the 
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Aereo decision.80 As we canvassed earlier, similar services offered by Wizzgo (in France),81 TV Catchup 
(in the UK),82 Singtel Optus’ TV Now (in Australia)83 and RecordTV (in Singapore)84—as well as 
Save.tv85 and Shift.tv86—were all subject to legal challenges from the media/broadcast industry that, in 
some cases, went up to the highest courts. Even in the USA, cases involving similar types of technology, 
including Cablevision, ivi TV, FilmOn and Aereo,87 had been decided earlier in the lower courts. One of 
the exclusive rights under US copyright law that is arguably the analogue to the ‘communication to the 
public’ right examined earlier in this article is the right of the copyright owner to ‘perform the 
copyrighted work publicly’.88 According to the definition in the statute (ie the ‘Transmit Clause’), to 
perform a work ‘publicly’ includes: 
to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance … of the work … to the public, by means of any 
device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display 
receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.89 
We shall now examine the latest line of cases in the USA to show how the trend continues to favour a 
reading of the exclusive right that is against the unauthorized use of such technology. 
USA—the Aereo Decisions 
Aereo charged US$8 a month for its subscribers to pull broadcasting signals using its system of remotely-
located small antennae and to stream real-time ‘live’ TV on their devices almost contemporaneously (the 
‘live’ option). Aereo also allowed consumers to record the programmes for viewing at a later time (the 
‘time-shifting’ option). Its system automatically assigns an individualized set of antenna and transcoder to 
each individual subscriber, thereby producing a personal and unique copy of the TV programme for the 
requesting consumer on a remote server that can be played back by that consumer only. In carrying out 
the operations of its service, Aereo neither paid statutory or negotiated licence fees nor compensated 
copyright owners in any way for the re-transmission of their content. The TV signals came from major 
broadcast networks (including Fox Broadcasting Company, CBS Broadcasting and National Broadcasting 
Company), which viewed Aereo’s business model as infringing their exclusive rights as copyright owners 
to, inter alia, ‘publicly perform’ their works.90 On the other hand, Aereo sought to argue that it was 
merely operating in accordance with the law: that its act of re-transmitting free-to-air content to 
consumers online did not constitute a ‘public performance’. 
The Second Circuit decision 
Prior to the USSC decision, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (by a majority of 2:1) in 
WNET, Thirteen v Aereo, Inc91 had reached the opposite conclusion to find that the transmissions effected 
by Aereo’s system to individual subscribers were not ‘public performances’. The Second Circuit relied on 
its own prior decision in Cartoon Network92 to hold, inter alia, that because these on-demand 
transmissions were made from personalized copies that were delivered to subscribers on a one-to-one 
basis, these transmissions/communications were not to ‘the public’. 
The technology at issue in Cartoon Network related to Cablevision’s Remote-Storage Digital Video 
Recorder (‘RS-DVR’), which is somewhat similar to a traditional DVR. The RS-DVR system splits the 
data stream into two. One of these two streams is sent via coaxial cable to consumers in the style of a 
traditional ‘live’ broadcast. The other stream goes through a broadband media router to be buffered and 
reformatted and later sent to the ‘Arroyo Server’ to be stored for the one subscriber who had requested the 
programme. RS-DVR technology therefore allows consumers to use their cable set-top box to perform 
essentially the same functions as a stand-alone DVR, such that every copy made by the system existed 
only for one consumer. 
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The Second Circuit held, on these facts, that the creation and subsequent transmission of 
individualized/unique copies were relevant to the inquiry of whether a ‘public performance’ had taken 
place, and where limitations were placed on the potential audience of a particular transmission of a 
performance, the playbacks on the RS-DVR did not constitute ‘public’ performances.93 In other words, if 
the potential audience of any particular transmission of a TV programme was only ‘one’, then the 
transmission in question would be considered ‘private’. 
Aereo similarly argued that its technology merely enabled its subscribers to view individualized copies of 
TV programmes ‘privately’. The Second Circuit, following its own reasoning and interpretation of the 
‘Transmit Clause’ in Cartoon Network, affirmed the lower court’s decision94 and held (2:1) that the 
broadcasters’ exclusive right to ‘perform the copyrighted work(s) publicly’ had not been infringed by 
Aereo.95 Because Aereo’s system was found to be materially indistinguishable from the RS-DVR system 
in Cartoon Network, the earlier decision was therefore binding on the Second Circuit in Aereo. 
Dissenting judge Denny Chin, however, disagreed with the majority, arguing that Aereo’s individualized 
system—which he labelled ‘a sham’ and ‘a Rube Goldberg-like contrivance’96—was devised ‘to avoid the 
reach of the Copyright Act’ and with the intention of taking ‘advantage of a perceived loophole in the 
law’.97 His Honour opined that Aereo’s system fell squarely within the plain language of the ‘Transmit 
Clause’ and that ‘what Aereo [was] doing [was] not in any sense “private”’.98 In other words, Aereo was 
clearly engaging in ‘public’ performances.99 
Judge Chin was, in our view, also correct in his analysis that the ‘Transmit Clause’ ought to be interpreted 
broadly, in line with legislative history and Congressional intent.100 Above all, we respectfully agree with 
his Honour’s view that ‘form’ should never be allowed to prevail over ‘substance’101 and that the 
majority’s decision in this regard would provide ‘a blueprint for others to avoid the Copyright Act’s 
licensing regime altogether’.102 
The USSC decision 
The appeal by the broadcasters was heard in the USSC in April 2014. Aereo had enjoyed several legal 
victories before various lower courts—including the Massachusetts District Court in Hearst Stations Inc v 
Aereo, Inc (‘Hearst’)103—but later lost in Utah. There, Aereo had sought to rely on the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Aereo as well as the Hearst decision (which were not binding on the District Court in Utah), 
but Judge Kimball nevertheless granted an injunction in favour of the broadcasters.104 
Before the USSC, Aereo argued that it was merely providing a platform or facility that allowed its 
subscribers to access their own unique copies of free-to-air TV programmes, which were already 
available to them in any event. The broadcasters, on the other hand, argued that Aereo operated in a 
manner similar to cable-TV companies, which are statutorily required to pay fees for re-transmission. 
During oral argument, one of the primary concerns raised by the Supreme Court bench was how their 
decision in Aereo would impact other technologies that might be implicated under a broadened definition 
of ‘public performance’, such as cloud technology. The broadcasters had argued that the ‘Transmit 
Clause’ in the US Copyright Act 1976 ought to be interpreted expansively, whereas the narrower 
construction of re-transmission rights advanced by Aereo could well provide a precedent for other 
technology companies to work around having to pay re-transmission fees to TV companies, thereby 
undermining the statutory protection accorded to these copyright owners. 
In a 6:3 decision in favour of the broadcasters, the USSC reversed the ruling of the Second Circuit. The 
majority took the view that Aereo was not simply an equipment provider, likened the activities of Aereo 
to those of cable-TV companies and concluded that Aereo (and not just its subscribers) had clearly 
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‘performed’. Despite the technological differences in the way content was delivered by Aereo and by 
traditional cable-TV companies to their respective viewers, the Court opined that these differences were 
not sufficient to change the outcome,105 particularly given Aereo’s ‘overwhelming likeness’ to these 
cable-TV companies.106 
As Justice Breyer observed, in delivering the majority’s judgment, ‘Aereo’s activities are substantially 
similar to those of the CATV [i.e. community antenna TV] companies that Congress amended the 
[Copyright] Act to reach’.107 His Honour further explained that: 
Aereo’s equipment may serve a ‘viewer function’; it may enhance the viewer’s ability to receive a 
broadcaster’s programs. It may even emulate equipment a viewer could use at home. But the same was 
true of the equipment that was before the Court, and ultimately before Congress, in Fortnightly and 
Teleprompter.108 
Those were earlier USSC decisions involving CATV companies,109 which were explicitly overturned by 
Congress through amendments to the US Copyright Act in 1976 so as to include cable-TV systems within 
the scope of the Act.110 
As to the second issue of whether Aereo had performed the relevant copyright works ‘publicly’ within the 
meaning of the ‘Transmit Clause’, the majority rejected Aereo’s argument that because it used individual 
antennae to transmit programmes to individual subscribers upon their command and these transmissions 
were only capable of being received on a one-to-one basis, it had transmitted ‘privately’ and not 
‘publicly’. 
Again, the majority—in giving effect to Congressional intent—was of the view that such technological 
attributes (and differences) were immaterial as they do not, in substance, distinguish Aereo’s system from 
other cable-TV systems (which clearly perform ‘publicly’). A finding otherwise would indeed have 
encouraged other cable-TV companies to re-align their operations to fit Aereo’s model so as to avoid 
paying licensing and re-transmission fees. Furthermore, the text of the ‘Transmit Clause’111 actually 
suggests that the Copyright Act was meant to target any entity that transmitted a performance through 
‘multiple, discrete transmissions’, so long as the performance was of the same work.112 It was also 
apparent that Aereo’s subscribers constitute ‘the public’ as Aereo’s re-transmissions were to a large 
number of unrelated people (outside of a family and its social circle), all unknown to one another.113 It 
therefore appears that the majority, in its analysis, was mindful not to allow form or technicalities to 
trump the true substance of each transmission made by Aereo to its subscribers on a purportedly 
‘individual’ basis. We respectfully agree with the majority’s approach, which we submit is in line with the 
reasoning adopted by the CJEU and the English courts in the TV Catchup decisions (discussed above). 
USA—Summary 
In summary, the authors are of the opinion that despite the uncomfortable comparisons of Aereo to cable-
TV systems (due to the technological differences mentioned above), the USSC was correct in reversing 
the Second Circuit and taking a broad reading of the ‘Transmit Clause’ as being necessary to meet 
Congressional intent. Further, by not allowing ‘form’ (the technological manner in which Aereo provides 
its service) to prevail over ‘substance’ (the true nature of Aereo’s activities), the Court’s approach would 
better enable the USA to discharge her international obligations to protect—more effectively—the 
exclusive rights of ‘communication’ (and, in particular, ‘making available’) to ‘the public’ as prescribed 
under the WIPO Internet treaties.114 As the authors have argued above and as recent case law in several 
leading jurisdictions suggest, the aggregation of ‘multiple, discrete transmissions’ occurring on a 
substantial scale can and should constitute ‘public performances’ in the USA. 
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It should be noted that Justice Breyer was cautious in confining the Court’s decision to the facts of that 
particular case, stating that it does not prejudge the legality of digital lockers and other new technologies 
(such as cloud computing). In fact, his Honour stressed that the majority’s ruling should not endanger or 
discourage the development of other forms of technology. Although this is only opinio juris (provided 
that the same Justices sit to hear the issue when it next comes before the USSC), the caution expressed 
will probably translate to judicial hesitancy to rule against these other forms of technology. 
Also, the outcome of this case does not mean that the technology in question (ie Internet streaming) 
cannot be developed further or that Aereo cannot find a way to continue its business, although this may 
require them to re-negotiate their role with the broadcast industry, pay re-transmission fees or provide 
some other form of benefit to the industry players in return for the licence to re-distribute their content. 
Concomitantly, the experience could well be an impetus for the TV industry—in line with developments 
in the music industry—to redefine and update their business models to embrace new forms of distribution 
technology. In Singapore, for example, because of the incursion of RecordTV (the provider of new 
technology) into what it viewed as its ‘turf’, MediaCorp (the broadcaster) also created and ‘upgraded’ its 
online platform (Xin MSN) to stream and re-distribute its own content in a manner similar to RecordTV 
but on its own terms. The TV Everywhere initiative in the USA is another example, albeit with more 
expensive subscriptions by users to multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs), consisting of 
the more traditional cable companies, satellite providers and telcos. Hulu (jointly owned by major 
broadcast networks), Netflix and Amazon (online services with content deals with networks) all operate 
likewise, although they are not ‘live’ TV. In short, it appears that the ‘cord-cutting’ trend is likely to 
continue. We shall examine, in greater detail, these alternative business models in the Section ‘Possible 
legal exceptions or exemptions and alternative business models’ of this article. 
POSSIBLE LEGAL EXCEPTIONS OR EXEMPTIONS AND ALTERNATIVE BUSINESS 
MODELS 
The preponderance of case authorities (emanating from the apex court of numerous leading jurisdictions) 
which have interpreted the right of ‘communication to the public’—as well as the right of ‘public 
performance’ in the USA—suggest that the Cartoon Network and RecordTV decisions are no longer 
defensible and ought to be re-considered at the earliest opportunity. 
However, there were good policy reasons behind those decisions; in particular, the importance of 
accommodating new technologies to avoid the chilling of future technological innovation and new 
business models for the wider reach and commercial exploitation of copyrighted materials. The courts in 
Cartoon Network and RecordTV must have taken cognisance of the path set by the Sony Betamax case115 
that paved the way for the development of modern recording and distribution technologies and their 
associated benefits—not least of which is remote, quick, easy and convenient access, anytime and 
anywhere, to audiovisual works. The socio-cultural benefits of iDVR services and their time-shifting (and 
space-shifting) functions were also palpable from the courts’ opinion. For example, the Singapore CA in 
RecordTV was particularly persuaded by the ‘tangible benefits’ of a ‘more convenient and user-friendly’ 
online time-shifting service (which was described as a ‘significant technological improvement’).116 
However, despite the justifications for the outcome in those cases, the legal approach taken by the courts 
is, in our view, not defensible given the inescapable premise that direct or primary copyright infringement 
is a strict liability tort, where liability is made out once an alleged infringer is shown to have performed 
any act that falls within the scope of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights.117 
The authors posit that there are, possibly, two alternative (or perhaps complementary) approaches to this 
issue. First, an open-ended fair use/dealing provision can be interpreted to legitimize such technology, 
although this requires statutory amendments in jurisdictions that do not have such a provision and judicial 
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activism in the application of the doctrine.118 Alternatively, and perhaps also more realistically and 
providing greater certainty, a specific fair use/dealing exception or statutory safe harbour can be 
considered to more narrowly exempt such technology from primary copyright liability in a way that 
strikes a fair compromise for both copyright owners and technology providers. Second, rather than tweak 
the technological functions to exploit an apparent legal ‘loophole’ (which has since proven to be a risky 
and largely unsuccessful strategy), technology companies should themselves embrace alternative business 
models that would help keep them afloat or even allow them to thrive. There are some real examples of 
how this might work, which will be elucidated below. 
Utilizing statutory exceptions and safe harbours—rather than for the courts to purposively re-interpret the 
meaning and scope of the exclusive rights provisions to determine liability—would have several benefits, 
and also obviate the problems that can potentially be caused by the latter approach. The former approach 
allows for open endorsement of public policy influences in a court’s decision, particularly as regards the 
fairness analysis in the context of the open-ended (and more flexible) fair use/dealing defence. For 
example, the CA decision in RecordTV was heavily influenced by policy considerations, which were to 
prevent the chilling of future technological innovation and the suppression of markets for copyright-
exploiting devices/services.119 On the other hand, introducing specific function-based exemptions or 
purpose-based exceptions would allow for a more measured and gradual approach to carving out 
exclusions from the reach of copyright’s exclusive rights so as to accommodate other competing interests. 
Such an approach will also avoid the various uncertainties posed to other forms of new technology, which 
was a major concern raised in reactions to the Aereo decision.120 
Statutory exceptions or exemptions 
General fair use/dealing exception 
Even though, for the reasons given above, primary copyright liability does not provide sufficient leeway 
for public interest considerations to be taken into account, they may well be relevant in a court’s 
assessment of possible statutory defences. This, in our view, represents a more appropriate and defensible 
doctrinal route for the consideration of policy. 
The option of interpreting the fair use/dealing exception to legitimize the technological functions of 
remote recording and distribution devices and/or services is only open to countries that have an open-
ended fair use/dealing provision, such as the USA and Singapore. In most other jurisdictions (such as the 
UK, Canada and Australia), the copyright fair dealing exceptions must meet certain specified or listed 
purposes, thereby narrowing the scope and flexibility of these provisions considerably.121 
Perhaps Aereo’s lawyers did not see the need to raise the defence of fair use as they were minded to 
structure their arguments on the basis of non-infringement (ie that Aereo’s activities did not constitute 
‘public performances’ at all). But even if that were the case, they could still have advanced alternative 
arguments to the effect that even if there were to be infringement, the fair use defence could arguably 
have absolved Aereo from liability.122 Some scholars have observed that: 
Courts have consistently followed Sony’s fair use holding, protecting consumers’ rights to store and 
review copyrighted works to which they have obtained lawful access … To the extent that Aereo’s system 
provides the same functionality to consumers, they should enjoy the same fair use privilege to use it.123 
Unfortunately though, Justice Breyer in his majority opinion only briefly stated, without further 
elucidation, that ‘the doctrine of “fair use” can help to prevent inappropriate or inequitable applications of 
the [Transmit] Clause’.124 
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Specific fair use/dealing exception or statutory safe harbour exemption 
In his dissenting opinion in the Aereo case, Justice Scalia observed thus:125 
It is not the role of this Court to identify and plug loopholes. It is the role of good lawyers to identify and 
exploit them, and the role of Congress to eliminate them if it wishes. Congress can do that, I may add, in a 
much more targeted, better informed, and less disruptive fashion than the crude ‘looks-like-cable-TV’ 
solution the Court invents today. 
Just as the legislature can be motivated by public policy reasons to sanction the technology in Aereo, it 
too can be motivated by equally, if not more, compelling reasons to provide for statutory fair use/dealing 
exceptions (both open-ended and purpose-specific) or safe harbour exemptions to condone the future 
development of new technologies. 
Specific fair use/dealing exception 
There is nothing to stop the legislature from creating a specific fair use/dealing exception for online 
recording (time-shifting) and distribution (streaming) services offered by third parties. The fair use 
doctrine has, as its primary focus, society as a whole and the individual user of copyrighted material in 
particular. Existing provisions currently provide for that benefit through, inter alia, permitting the 
facilitative functions of third party service providers and information products (such as libraries, 
educational institutions and in relation to the provision of reading aids for the physically and intellectually 
handicapped) as well as the backing up of computer programs. Attempts have also been made in some 
countries to modernize the exceptions/exemptions in their copyright legislation to accommodate access to 
and use of online time-shifting (albeit confined to individual users only). 
Notably, the Canadian Copyright Modernization Act126 introduced new exceptions for user-generated 
content (UGC) created using copyrighted works127 as well as expanded the scope of the fair dealing 
exception to include education, satire and parody (which are common in UGC).128 More noteworthy and 
of particular relevance to the thesis of this article are the exceptions for reproduction for private purposes 
(applicable to individuals),129 time- and format-shifting by individuals130 as well as the making of backup 
copies of copyrighted works without digital locks.131 It is interesting to note that there is an exception 
(amongst others) in the Singapore Copyright Act 1987 for an ‘exempt recording’ of a performance by a 
person for ‘private and domestic use’.132 Arguably, the sale of devices and the offer of services that 
facilitate such ‘private and domestic’ activities should similarly be protected from any possible liability 
arising. Further, if ‘private and domestic’ copying is to be treated as a ‘user’s right’, then in order to 
facilitate such rights (which would include a user’s time-shifting activities), the case can be made for 
enacting specific statutory exceptions for recording technologies to exempt them from copyright 
liability.133 Just as anti-circumvention provisions in copyright law complement a copyright owner’s use of 
digital rights management to protect his IP rights in the online environment, the same argument can be 
made for the protection of new technologies that can further a ‘user’s right’ to private viewing, time-
shifting and space-shifting. 
It should be noted that the USSC in Aereo did not specifically address the time-shifting function offered 
by Aereo’s system, but only its ‘live’ (or close to ‘live’) function. It is possible that the majority’s 
interpretation of the ‘public performance’ right might not extend to time-shifting.134 Nevertheless, for the 
sake of certainty, it is preferable for Congress to provide a clear and unambiguous exception to cover this 
particular function if it so chooses. 
Statutory safe harbour exemption 
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In relation to safe harbours that are tailor made for third parties facilitating access to electronic copies of 
materials online, many countries have already updated their copyright laws to incorporate such 
provisions. For example, the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 (with similar amendments made 
to the Singapore Copyright Act 1987) provides safe harbour—under certain circumstances—to Internet 
intermediaries in respect of their functions (such as transmitting, routing and providing connections, 
allowing for system caching, as well as providing facilities for the storage of information and for 
hyperlinking).135 
Likewise, a statutory safe harbour can be enacted to provide some limited (but targeted) relief for certain 
categories of time-shifting and streaming technology and their functions, with built-in pre-requisites or 
eligibility requirements (such as no financial benefit accruing136 and no control over users’ activities) 
and/or conditions (eg instating a notice and take down procedure). 
The potentially adverse effects of the Aereo decision on cloud computing technology and cloud storage 
facilities have been noted by many commentators and even by the USSC itself:137 
… Congress, while intending the Transmit Clause to apply broadly to cable companies and their 
equivalents, did not intend to discourage or to control the emergence or use of different kinds of 
technologies. … [q]uestions involving cloud computing, [remote storage] DVRs, and other novel issues 
not before the Court, as to which ‘Congress has not plainly marked [the] course,’ should await a case in 
which they are squarely presented.138 
Given the general unease and uncertainty post Aereo, we would argue that a strong case can be made for a 
clearly worded statutory exception or exemption that would apply to these other forms of new technology 
as well. 
Alternative business models 
Despite these problems, the legal repercussions on new technologies may well be overstated, given the 
widespread availability of streaming technology that has supplemented the cable-TV business model well 
before the Aereo decision. For example, Hulu, Netflix and Slingbox are some alternative models available 
on the market (albeit more costly to consumers) that offer the delivery of broadcast programmes—
through streaming technology and outside of the traditional TV sets and physical DVR set-top boxes—to 
consumers’ devices for their convenience. 
Some alternative business models that companies like Aereo can possibly adopt include: 
Make a case for compulsory licensing 
Aereo can perhaps build on the USSC’s assessment that it bears an ‘overwhelming likeness’ to a cable 
company by arguing that it is indeed one and to compel broadcast companies to license their programmes 
and content under the retransmission consent rules of the US Copyright Act 1976.139 This will provide 
consumers with a greater variety of channel packages and bundles at more competitive prices, ultimately 
benefiting them. However, the chances of such a possibility remain uncertain (and arguably unlikely) as it 
has been reported that Aereo’s erstwhile attempts to be considered a cable company failed at the US 
Copyright Office and in the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.140 The only glimmer of hope is 
in amending the law and changing the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) rules to 
accommodate online TV services like Aereo.141 
Voluntary licensing and other partnership arrangements with broadcast companies 
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In our view, voluntary licensing and entering into other partnership arrangements would still be the best 
option. Hulu and Netflix, despite inheriting some of the existing ‘problems’ of broadcast companies, are 
examples of licensing or joint venture arrangements that work within the copyright regime (rather than 
against it). Both provide on-demand video streaming services through their respective websites. Netflix is 
an independent company that streams TV content mostly originating from production companies it is not 
affiliated to (ie third parties). Audiences have to create an account and pay a subscription fee according to 
their subscription plan to be able to view Netflix’s content. In contrast, Hulu is a joint venture established 
by Comcast, Fox and Walt Disney. It is essentially an alternative distribution channel for the copyright 
works of these production companies and mainly offers content from its partners. Audiences can access 
Hulu’s content on its website without signing up for an account or paying subscription. Indeed, the 
Spotify model for free or paid music streaming may also be explored as an alternative business model to 
pursue, provided that the royalty distribution scheme is viable and can appeal to the broadcast companies. 
Unfortunately, Spotify—which distributes royalties according to the popularity of songs (as determined 
by the volume of streams per month)—has itself faced criticism over the fairness of its business model to 
artistes and their financial backers.142 As such, its viability as an alternative form of music distribution in 
the long run remains uncertain, even as the company faces more competition in the market for online 
music libraries. 
An exception for the time- and space-shifting functions 
As highlighted above, the Aereo decision was specifically confined to Aereo’s (almost) ‘live’ re-
transmission function. As such, technologies that provide for a reasonable time lag between the original 
broadcast and the re-transmission at the user’s initiation are strictly not prohibited from doing so by that 
decision. Moreover, the open-ended fair use/dealing exception (if and where available) would, arguably, 
already provide a viable defence for such technology unless and until there is a specific statutory 
exception for time-shifting (as is the case in Canada).143 Another technological function around which 
business models can be built and that can survive the series of decisions against Aereo (and similar 
systems) is space/place-shifting—presently offered by products such as Slingbox—which provides for the 
private re-transmittal of programmes across different devices. This service is now also offered by Dish’s 
‘Hopper with Sling’, TiVo and others. 
Broadcast industry diversification 
On the flipside, many broadcast companies and networks have already moved towards offering content 
through their own websites to compete with these new technologies—for example, by developing, buying 
or licensing similar forms of technology.144 The broadcast industry can adopt the same forms of 
technology to offer such services to their users so as to directly compete with other independent 
technology providers (like Aereo). Some TV companies and cable networks have already set up websites 
offering consumers some of their programmes for free streaming (but only after the original air dates for 
the programmes) and via video on-demand services (including ‘live’ events). As noted, Hulu and Xin 
MSN are examples where the respective copyright owners are personally and actively involved in 
harnessing technology—rather than fighting against it—to compete for viewership. 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude with several observations. First, more than one exclusive right under the copyright regime 
can be implicated (depending on the jurisdiction involved) when the development and provision of 
modern communications technology (including streaming and time-shifting technology)—whether as 
products or services—is involved. 
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Second, although the TV Catchup and Aereo decisions only concerned liability issues arising from 
streaming technology (with the majority of the USSC in the latter case confining its decision to the 
specific facts before the tribunal), the authors respectfully submit, in line with our arguments above, that 
the Second Circuit’s decision in Cartoon Network and the Singapore CA's decision in RecordTV—both of 
which involved time-shifting technology—must now be re-considered in light of the preponderance of 
recent case authorities (many emanating from the apex court of leading jurisdictions) and academic 
commentary. It appears that courts are less likely to accept the legality of new technologies that attempt to 
exploit loopholes in the law, particularly those that take the form of a ‘Rube Goldberg-like’ contraption. 
Instead, the judicial trend is to go down the ‘result-driven’ path and, in not allowing technological ‘form’ 
to trump the true ‘substance’ of the transmission/communication in question, interpret the relevant 
exclusive rights provision(s) expansively in favour of copyright owners. As some academics have 
advised, technological design should never determine legal outcome,145 although it has also been urged 
that the law should provide for greater certainty and guidelines on what can and cannot be developed by 
technology companies so as to avoid unnecessary loss of investment, time and resources. 
Third, the present judicial sentiment towards streaming (and to a lesser extent, time-shifting) technology 
has certainly not sounded the death knell for Aereo (and similar technology providers). It simply means 
that these technology companies should seek out alternative business models that are legally compliant 
and financially viable, many of which are actually available on the market. 
Fourth, it may be timely for the legislature to embark on a careful study of the various issues at hand, 
considering, in particular, public policy interests as well as reassessing the objectives of the copyright 
system vis-à-vis new storage and distribution technologies in the digital environment. In delineating the 
rights of (and finding the right balance between) copyright owners and technology providers/users, it may 
be necessary to introduce legislative amendments to provide for open-ended or specific exceptions and/or 
safe harbours to condone the future development of such technologies. 
Fifth, despite the outcomes reached in the cases discussed in this article (which should, in theory, be 
confined to the specific forms of technology implicated, save for the second observation we made above), 
the verdict is still out on the legality of other forms of online storage and distribution technology—not yet 
considered in case law—that provide a different type of service to consumers, such as cloud computing 
and cloud storage facilities.146 Again, for the sake of certainty, the legislature should perhaps pre-empt 
what are foreseeable disputes, and a confused treatment by the courts, by amending the law to set out the 
rules to accommodate (or, in rare cases and with good reason, prohibit) such technology. 
Aereo may be the latest in the line of cases dealing with streaming and/or time-shifting technology, but it 
will certainly not be the last word on the subject. It remains to be seen how other forms of new 
technology will fare when such cases come before the courts in future. In the meantime, sans statutory 
intervention, it appears that the future of Internet streaming (and arguably, to a lesser extent, time-
shifting) of public broadcast material looks bleak if the prior consent of the relevant copyright owner(s) 
has not been sought. Technology providers are better off making alternative business plans to ensure their 
continued survival in an increasingly hostile global legal environment.147 
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